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DECONTROLLING THE MAIZE MARKETING 
SYSTEM IN KENYA 
by 
Hans G. Gsaenger and Guenter Schmidt 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper the authors assess the major deficiencies of the present 
maize marketing system in Kenya, discuss the implications of a completely de-
controlled maize market, analyse the effects of different types of stabili-
sation schemes, and review the Indian and Pakistani experience with private 
performance and various types of government intervention in food grain market-
ing systems. An alternative scheme for regulating the Kenyan maize market is 
suggested and proposals are made for the implementation of such a scheme. 
The most appropriate form of control of the maize marketing system 
in Kenya would seem to be a price stabilisation scheme with bufferstock operations 
to be carried out by the Maize and Produce Board. The Board would act as a 
buyer and seller of maize to keep price fluctuations within certain limits, 
and in addition keep a strategic reserve in case of drought. The implemen-
tation of this system requires a network of rural collection centres and Maize 
and Produce Board stores, located in these centres as well as in strategic 
markets in deficit areas. A market information system has to be established and 
movement restrictions lifted, and the price structure and rules for the Board's 
operations have to be clearly defined. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Kenya there are three channels through which a producer can 
market his maize; a) the parastatal Maize and Produce Board (MFB), b) 
directly to consumers or c) through market traders. The first two channels 
are legal, the third is allowed by law if no inter-district trade is involved. 
For other transactions the sale is only lawful if a movement permit is 
granted by the MFB prior to shipment. The MFB controlled channel is usually 
referred to as the "formal marketing" system, while the other two are considered 
"informal". Relatively little is known about the informal system and its mar-
keting problems (5), but it is estimated that about half 0^ the maize sold 
in Kenya moves through the informal system by local (and illicit) inter-
district trade. 
This paper attempts to assess the major deficiencies of the 
present maize marketing system and to propose an alternative approach for 
regulating the Kenyan maize markets. 
The major hypotheses ares-
- that the present "control" system is an impediment to an optimal 
allocation of resources, thus causing welfare losses, 
- that the system of fixed prices for all levels of the marketing 
chain causes distortions in the marketing system leading to welfare 
losses to producers and consumers, 
- that a bufferstock scheme would be more appropriate for regulating 
the maize market than the present system of control, 
- that any form of government intervention in the pricing and 
marketing of maize is likely to fail as long as the rural assembly 
function is only partly developed. 
MAJOR DEFICIENCIES OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM 
The control exercised through the MFB is aimed at regulating pro-
duction and external and internal marketing of maize while maintaining a 
strategic reserve and guaranteeing satisfactory prices to consumers and 
producers."'" (18, p. 4.) While there is evidence that the MFB is providing 
fairly reliable outlets for maize in surplus areas, it is apparently failing 
to stabilise prices for consumers both in surplus and deficit areas, In 
addition, it is questionable whether small-scale producers in surplus areas 
are always able to actually receive the guaranteed farm-gate prices because 
of limited buying capacities of the MFB shortly after harvest. The volume 
1. How these controls are implemented is described extensively in 
Hesselmark and Lorenzl. (5). 
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of illicit trade indicates that the present regional price differentiation is 
not in line with actual prices established by supply and demand prevailing in 
rural deficit areas and with transfer costs (also including risk premiums for 
illicit trade) incurred for shipping maize from surplus to deficit areas. 
The dualistic features of the formal and informal system suggest 
that the present control system needs to be revised. The national Development 
Plan 1970-74 already pointed out that:-
With a view to improving efficiency, the policies and structures 
of the agricultural marketing system will be subjected to more 
thorough appraisal and changes made where appropriate.... For 
instance, it is expected that some measure of decontrol will 
be introduced into maize marketing in order to reduce the share 
of final price being absorbed by the marketing system. (8, p. 198) 
However, since 1969 no major alteration of the maize marketing policy has been 
implemented. Stating this, the 1974-78 Plan outlines that changes 
will be introduced early in the new Plan period. Under the 
proposed marketing system maize millers will be free to purchase 
their requirements direct from farmers without going through the 
Maize and Produce Board. The Board will purchase any maize 
offered to it at a guaranteed floor price and will sell maize to 
anyone requiring it at a fixed price. It will also be responsible 
for maintaining strategic reserve and for all imports and exports. 
(9, p. 234) 
Although the latest Plan indicates the direction of change envisaged it is not 
at all explicit about the regulatory function of the MFB. It appears that 
the MFB will act as a competitive buyer and seller and will be able to 
perform its price stabilising functions by virtue of a large market share. 
In assessing the present system of intervention in the pricing and 
marketing of maize, the nature of supply and demand fluctuations and thus 
price fluctuations has to be studied. For any price policy, it is important 
to know whether the major source of instability is price or yield fluctuations. 
In Kenya, Hesselmark showed that total maize output depends far more on rain-
fall than on producer prices. (2) Especially for the small-scale farming sector 
which contributes about 47 per cent of the total marketed output, prices of 
inputs and rainfall availability determine total output of maize more than prices 
paid to producers.^ 
For the large-scale farming sector Maitha (17) has shown that price 
supply response with respect to maize acreage is quite high (Kenya short-run 
2. A study under way will provide more precise information; L.M. Awiti, 
An Empirical Study on Farm Factors Determining the Marketed Surplus of Maize 
in Kenya, M. Sc. thesis, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of 
Nairobi, in preparation. 
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elasticity 0.95, India-Pakistan 0.23, according to Krishna, 13)., He concludes 
that the high price elasticity, partly explainable by the absence of "shifter 
3 
variables" during the period under study, would justify a relaxation of the 
price fixing policy and the introduction of a "floor and ceiling" price system. 
Empirical evidence now available strongly indicates that the nature 
of the instabilities observed in the maize output of Kenya is attributable to 
a large extent to yield fluctuations, especially in the small-farm sector. A 
pricing policy which is set to provide incentives for increased production calls 
under these circumstances for a support price system that ensures:-
- a shift in technologies to increase and stabilise yields, 
and 
- a spatial distribution of production that encourages production 
in areas with comparatively low unit costs. 
The present pricing policy, by fixing prices at inappropriate levels and 
providing inadequate regional differentiation, encourages production in 
marginal areas, thus leading to welfare losses for both farmers and consumers. 
In the following section we examine alternative solutions for the 
problems of the Kenyan maize marketing system and discuss the welfare impli-
cations for consumers and producers. 
IS COMPLETE DECONTROL DESIRABLE? 
A free market system for maize in Kenya, i.e. the absence of any 
control or pricing policy, might lead to drastic fluctuations in terms of out-
put, and in the prices received by the farmers and paid by the consumers. In 
order to judge the magnitude of the fluctuations which could be expected it is 
necessary to shed some light on the dichotomous character of the maize pro-
duction system, characterised by completely commercialised large farms and 
subsistence oriented small farms. Out of the total maize crop of 2.1 million 
metric tons (1975/1976), approximately 760,000 metric tons entered the market-
ing systems. The formal system (MFB) received about 493,000 metric tons or 
64 per cent of the total marketed crop. The large-scale farming sector con-
tributed about 256,000 metric tons or 53 per cent, while the small-farm sector 
provided the remaining 237,000 metric tons or 47 per cent. (All figures are 
estimates, calculated on the basis of available information in the 1975 
Statistical Abstract, 10, the 1976 Economic Survey, 11, and Hesselmark, 3.) 
Econometric studies have shown high responsiveness of the large 
commercial farms to price changes, so that any drastic reduction of the 
producer prices for maize would lead to a production shift from maize to 
either barley or wheat. This in turn would, ceteris paribus, lead to a sharp 
3, For India-Pakistan, Krishna (13) shows the relatively important role 
shifter variables such as rainfall, irrigated land,etc. play. 
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increase in consumer prices. The income elasticity of demand for maize in 
Nairobi in 1972 was 0.030, so the price elasticity of demand for maize will 
be somewhat in the same range since cross-elasticities are also rather low. 
With a demand elasticity close to zero, increasing consumer prices will have 
a negative effect on household incomes and will especially affect the position 
of low-income households. 
The small farmer's decision on what acreage to plant in maize is 
to a lesser extent dependent on producer prices than on home consumption needs. 
Up to SO to 70 per cent of the maize crop is for home consumption, and only 
the surplus beyond the farm household's needs enters the marketing system. 
Although a recent survey has shown that on a national level about 50 per cent 
of the farmer's food is purchased, the usual practice is to retain the amount 
4 
of maize necessary for the household's needs. Consequently, even if a free 
market system were introduced output fluctuations in the smallholder sector 
would probably not increase significantly since the maize price is only of minor 
importance in determining small-farm incomes. At the same time, it can be 
concluded that a policy of fixing producer prices is only partly effective in 
stabilising the income of subsistence oriented small-scale maize producers. 
A second element to be considered when discussing a free market 
system for maize is the structure of rural markets and the prevailing 
physical infrastructure. Rural collection centres, transport facilities, the 
transport system and degree of competition are all important elements in-
fluencing the flow of goods and the per unit costs of moving them to the final 
consumers. Case studies show that the small-farm sector faces high transport 
costs because of relatively low volumes, the underdeveloped network of rural 
collection centres, the lack of rural feeder roads, the lack of competition 
among traders and truckers and in some regions the large distances to MFB 
depots which adjoin the railways that were mainly built to serve the former 
"scheduled areas" of the white settlers, now comprising the large-farm sector. 
These structural deficiencies are unlikely to be solved by any interventionist 
legislation, but at least the present control system helps to protect the farmers 
to some extent from paying the marketing bill. On the other hand the fixing of 
trading, transport and milling margins leads to serious distortions already 
described in many studies, (5, G, 7) One is tempted to conclude that a 
4. KenyajCentral Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Rural Survey I and II, 
1976, unpublished. These findings do imply that farmers buy maize at certain 
stages of the year. Although this is true for a certain segment of the small-
scale producers, the figure shown does just simply average the highly skewed 
distribution of food purchases. 
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completely free market system is likely tos-
- contribute to more drastic supply fluctuations because of the responsiveness 
of the commercial farming sector, consequently leading to sharp fluctuations 
in consumer prices due to inelastic demand, 
— incur higher marketing costs because of poor market infrastructure and 
the low level of competition in rural markets, possibly lowering producer 
prices and increasing consumer prices at the same time. 
Consequently, a free market system for maize might have negative welfare 
implications. 
In addition, the sensitivity of maize output to climatic factors causes 
unpredictable fluctuations that might endanger national food security. Although 
Kenya is considered self-sufficient in maize "even under adverse conditions" 
(12, p. 25) a national food reserve has to be kept. The private sector will 
be neither able nor willing to perform such a function effectively. It is 
more likely that severe deficit situations will be abused by the private 
traders and millers for obtaining windfall gains. While a free market system 
is principally viable under supply conditions that are stabilised on a level 
5 
that meets aggregate domestic demand, some control has to be imposed to avoid 
welfare losses for the lower income brackets which comprise the majority of the 
population. 
Before entering a discussion of the most appropriate form of control 
for the Kenya maize market, some theoretical considerations will be outlined 
with regard to the welfare implications of different stabilisation schemes. 
This will help to delineate some criteria for a control system which could be 
viable within the Kenyan context. A general criterion for evaluating specific 
market control systems is the net welfare gains to be expected 
net welfare gains = additional consumer welfare + additional producer welfare -
costs of running the scheme. Q The net effects of a stabilisation scheme depend ons-
5. This is not a condition sine qua non since local deficits can be offset 
by imports, but as long as average production costs in Kenya are lower than import 
prices it would be uneconomic to rely on the world market. Since Kenya is more 
or less on the brink of becoming a net exporter of maize, the more relevant 
problem is the appropriate use of surpluses exceeding local demand. It can be 
argued that either diversification of production or the use of surplus maize for 
improving meat quality is more beneficial to the national economy than exporting 
maize at a loss, as has happened over the last ten years. (26, p. 181) 
6. The following discussion is based on a comparative static economic 
analysis. Although it might be argued that such an analysis does not really help 
to fully understand the highly complex mechanisms of supply response, it is 
believed that in the absence of empirically tested supply functions for the small-
farm sector this type of analysis will at least help to show the major pros 
and cons of various stabilisation schemes. 
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The source of random price fluctuations. If the fluctuation is due to 
random shifts in supply, then price stabilisation is beneficial to the 
producers. Consumers may lose from price stabilisation, but the net 
effects are positive,, This holds true regardless of whether supply 
is based on actual prices (perfect information) or on expected prices. 
If fluctuations are due to shifts in demand, then producers will lose 
from price stabilisation and consumers will gain from it. (19, 27) 
The type of stabilisation scheme. Traditional price stabilisation 
schemes and supply and demand stabilisation schemes are likely to pro-
duce different welfare results,, It can be shown that in the case of 
price elasticity of demand greater than price elasticity of supply, the 
welfare effects of supply stabilisation are greater than the welfare effects 
of price or demand stabilisation. Where price elasticity of supply is 
greater than price elasticity of demand, price stabilisation produces 
a higher welfare gain than supply or demand stabilisation. 
In both cases, demand stabilisation has the least significant wel-
fare effects. (25). 
The•budgetary implications of the stabilisation scheme. The financial 
burden incurred by the government is mainly a function of the size of 
stocks which are kept. This again is determined by the type of stabilisa-
tion scheme carried out and the way the intervention prices are set. 
In the case of a price stabilisation scheme, the costs involved are 
strongly influenced by the setting of selling and purchasing prices in line 
with the long-tern equilibrium price. The smaller the margin between the 
selling and purchasing price, the greater the number and magnitude of 
transactions and thus the number of changes in the stocks. If the prices 
are not set in line with the long-term trends the stocks either reach 
unacceptable levels causing tremendous financial burdens, or the stocks 
are exhausted quickly at the expense of the scheme's effectiveness in 
stabilising prices. Assuming the same size of stacks for different 
stabilisation schemes, the relative costs involved are determined 
by the degree of variation in government stocks. It can be assumed 
that demand stabilisation involves lower relative costs than price and 
supply stabilisation. The relative cost of price and supply stabilisa-
tion schemes, i.e. the variance in the stocks, depends on the re-
lationship between the elasticities of supply and demand. If the price 
elasticity of demand is greater than the price elasticity of supply, 
then the variation of stocks for supply stabilisation is greater than 
that for price stabilisation, or vice versa. (28) 
The managerial ability of the government agency responsible for implement-
ing the stabilisation scheme. The managerial capacity of the agency may 
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be a limiting factor for operating stabilisation schemes of various kinds. 
Given a low level of managerial capacity open market interventions, 
involving direct competition with the private sector, may be rather 
difficult to perform effectively. This competition is necessary in a 
demand stabilisation scheme because such a scheme involves selling 
directly to consumers. Also in supply stabilisation, if the market 
infrastructure is .unfavourable effective operations necessitate intake 
of the commodity in the rural surplus areas and a rather dense network 
of intake stations has to be operated in direct competition with private 
traders, who might be able to render additional services to the farmers 
which the agency cannot easily provide. Price stabilisation schemes 
which allow a relatively wide margin of floor and ceiling prices are 
easier to manage than the other two types. 
In the light of these considerations two stabilisation schemes should 
be considered to replace the present rigid control systems-
a. Price Stabilisation by defining "basepoints" of intervention in the maize 
market. Since the operating costs of the stabilisation scheme should be 
minimised in order to maximise the net welfare gains, the margin between 
the selling and purchasing price should be sufficiently wide. Since 
Kenya is on the brink of becoming a permanent exporter of maize, the 
lower limit (floor price) should not exceed the export parity price. 
The upper limit should be fixed at a level where the expected discounted 
value of the bufferstocks after a period of four to five years is the same 
as the starting value. (This period caters for annual fluctuations so that 
the annual marketed output is in line with the trends.) (28, p. 5) 
b. Supply Stabilisation by announcing support prices annually, which vary 
inversely with the expected output. Assuming farmers make "rational" 
decisions, their production decisions will be based on an expected price, 
implying that when the actual support price is announced the maize supply 
will be completely inelastic. The level of the support price should be 
determined by the expected equilibrium price taking into consideration 
the projected supply and demand. This stabilisation scheme needs 
sophisticated tools for estimating harvests and for projecting demand. 
Kenya has developed a method of forecasting maize output (3), and by means 
of this, it should be possible to arrive at rather reliable price 
estimates. The support price should not be fixed in terms of costs of 
production, mainly because shifts in technology are desirable to bring 
about a decline in per unit costs. Once the support price has been 
announced, the government agency buys and sells through the established 
trade channels. 
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Although price elasticity of supply is quite high in the commercial 
large-farm sector, the overall price elasticity of supply is rather small 
because of the small-farm sector, but it is still greater than the price 
elasticity of demand. Given this relationship, a price stabilisation 
scheme will be more beneficial than a supply stabilisation scheme. However, 
the random price fluctuations in Kenya are mainly due to shifts in supply, 
which means that a price stabilisation policy would result in a welfare loss 
for the consumers. To offset these negative effects, one might consider 
supplementing the price stabilisation scheme with subsidised consumption for 
certain vulnerable groups. This could be done either by introducing outlets 
which would sell subsidised maize or by issuing food vouchers which entitle 
certain people to buy food at subsidised prices. Since such a system is likely 
to be subverted by mismanagement and corruption, other devices for discriminating 
in favour of vulnerable groups should be thoroughly considered. 
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
In discussing the rigid controls of maize marketing in Kenya, it 
would seem worthwhile to review the respective policies of India and Pakistan. 
Like Kenya, both countries have a long history of government control 
in pricing and marketing their major staple food crops, wheat and rice, which 
goes back to colonial times. With the objectives of assuring adequate food 
supply, keeping prices low and stable, particularly for urban consumers, and 
preventing alleged exploitation of farmers and consumers by "parasitic" traders, 
various control systems have been established, such as compulsory procurement 
(state monopoly schemes), voluntary procurement, zoning of surplus and deficit 
areas along with movement restrictions (similar to those in Kenya for maize and 
beans), fixing minimum and maximum prices, "fair price distribution", and so 
forth. But unlike the situation in Kenya, the degree of intervention has 
varied over time and among different regions and commodities. 
After independence, India favoured free trade, but then revived 
controls in the late 1950s. Periods of intensive control were followed by 
periods of more relaxed controls, etc. In Pakistan, there has been a general 
policy of distributing portions of the food crop through "ration shops" at 
7 
fixed prices, but otherwise the wheat trade has been subject to relatively 
little direct intervention. Deliveries to the Government Procurement Centres 
(collection centres) which are comparable to the MFB depots have usually been 
on a voluntary basis. For rice, after a period of a liberal procurement policy 
a compulsory scheme was introduced, intended to maximise exports. 
7. The same policy is pursued in India. 
- 9 - IDS/DP 254 
To summarise, the marketing systems for the major staple foods in 
India and Pakistan have experienced varying degrees of government intervention. 
This history provides a unique opportunity to study private performance under 
the impact of different types of government intervention. One of the major 
questions is how effective has the private enterprise system been during times 
of relatively free trade. Often rigid controls are officially justified with 
the allegation that private traders are not able to perform the marketing 
function in a socially desirable way rather than exploiting consumers and 
producers. (4, p. 5) But if this does not hold true, governments could 
confine themselves to more indirect control measures such as have been described. 
These might be sufficient to correct undesirable features which may arise in 
a free competitive marketing system. 
Provided certain preconditions are met} a free enterprise system 
can be fairly efficient and thus complete government control is not necessary 
to stabilise the market, as can be seen from the Indian and Pakistani experiences. 
Research on the internal food marketing systems in both countries (14, 15, 16 and 
others quoted in 16) indicates that:-
- the private marketing system generally cannot be labelled 
exploitative. On the contrary, competition between traders at 
all levels of the marketing channel was found to be rather 
intensive, giving little scope for excess profits. 
- market integration is quite high, i.e. markets of various 
consuming and producing centres are closely related to each 
other. Price differences between markets are usually not greater 
than transfer costs. 
- returns on storage, on the average, are not unreasonable. Profits 
in some years are balanced by losses in others. 
- support price schemes through procurement operations (voluntary 
schemes) are usually able to stabilise producer prices. 
- zoning, movement restrictions and compulsory procurement have 
generally destabilising rather than stabilising effects. 
- price differences between markets are higher in periods of 
strict control than in periods of relatively free trade. 
All these findings suggest that marketing systems in developing 
countries which rely on private traders in conjunction with a government 
stabilisation scheme may be able to function in a socially desirable manner. 
Stable producer and consumer prices can be maintained by open market inter-
ventions if adequate supply of food is assured. 
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The Indian and Pakistani experiences only have bearing on Kenya if 
the structural differences between the countries are taken into consideration. 
Different socio-economic systems lead to specific structural features which 
may not allow a direct transfer of policies which have proved successful in 
one country. Therefore we shall briefly describe the basic differences and 
similarities between India and Pakistan on the one hand and Kenya on the other 
with respect to the marketing systems of staple food crops. 
The general level of development in terms of per capita income is 
rather low in all three countries, ranging from approximately US $100 in India 
to about US $130 in Kenya and Pakistan. The crucial role of the agricultural 
sector is expressed by its significant contribution to GNP (35 to 45 per cent) 
and the high proportion of the rural population depending directly or indirectly 
on agriculture. Only approximately 10 per cent of the Kenyan population lives 
in urban centres, whereas urbanisation in India (20 per cent) and Pakistan 
(25 per cent) is already more significant. 
The basic production patterns of the major staples on the Indian 
subcontinent are to some extent similar to those of maize in Kenya. The 
staples are produced in almost every region of these countries, but there 
are only a few surplus regions serving the urban and rural deficit areas. 
Wheat in Pakistan, for example, is produced in all provinces, but only the 
high-potential Punjab (Indus Basin, well developed irrigation system) produces 
major surpluses, contributing more than 70 per cent of the total output. (22) 
On the other hand, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province in 
particular are semi-arid areas with almost excusively rainfed wheat production 
and are far from being able to meet their own requirements. Similar situations 
exist in India for wheat, rice and millet. Thus, all three countries have 
distinct surplus and deficit areas leading to intensive interregional trade. 
Furthermore, dualistic agricultural production prevails in all three countries. 
In Pakistan for example 77 per cent of all farms are below 12.5 acres, and they 
account for only 32 per cent of the total farming area. (20) Consequently, 
the medium- and large-scale commercial farms which are quite sensitive to price 
changes contribute the major part of the marketed output. As the demand 
elasticities for staples are also rather low in India and Pakistan, the 
situation with respect to price fluctuations is almost the same as in Kenya. 
No significant differences in the degree of commercialisation of 
farming can be observed. On the Indian subcontinent as well as in Kenya, 
about 30 to 40 per cent of staple food production is marketed. (15, p. 44; 
24, pp. 63-64) However, taking the difference in size of the countries into 
account, the absolute amount of produce which has to be handled by the re-
spective marketing systems is considerably higher in India and Pakistan than 
in Kenya. Whereas in Kenya (1975/76) the maize marketing system handled about 
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760,00 metric tons (3), the wheat marketing system in Pakistan had to manage 
about 2.8 million metric tons of domestically produced wheat (35 per cent of 
the estimated total production) and more than 1,0 million metric tons of imported 
wheat, (21, pp. 17 and 22) In India, from 1955/56 to 1964/65 between 20 
and 40 million metric tons of food grains (wheat, rice, millet, maize and 
pulses) passed through the marketing channels each year (15, p. 44); imports 
of cereal at that time reached more than 10 million metric tons a year, 
(15, p. 227) As can be seen from the figures for India and Pakistan, despite 
the "Green Revolution" imports of foodgrains (wheat) still play an important 
role in assuring an adequate food supply for the population. By contrast, 
Kenya has been able to export part of its maize production. 
As pointed out already, within the Kenyan maize marketing system 
two different subsystems can be distinguished. The marketed production enter-
ing the formal system is either sold directly to one of the 33 MR3 depots 
(collection centres), mainly by large-scale farmers, or channelled through 
appointed agents, particularly by the smallholders. Rural wholesale assembly 
markets (primary markets) play a minor role in this system and they are poorly 
developed. Only a small part is bought in the rural markets by independent 
traders and sold to the depots. These transactions usually cause welfare losses 
for the farmers because the traders pay a price which is generally lower than 
the government fixed MFB buying price. 
The structure of the Indian and Pakistani grain marketing systems is 
8 9 quite different from that of Kenya. The basic pattern is as follows; A 
very small amount is exchanged partly on a barter basis in village shops, but 
almost the whole marketed output is channelled through primary wholesale markets. 
These markets are permanent daily markets with a sufficient number of commission 
agents acting on behalf of the sellers (farmers or primary buyers). Whole-
salers are either acting on their own behalf or on behalf of outside buyers 
(wholesalers, millers) on a commission basis. The surplus is brought to 
the market for the most part by the farmers themselves, or by itinerant or 
village traders collecting the produce in the villages, mainly from smaller 
8, The following presentation refers mainly to the more developed regions 
of both countries (e„g„ Punjab) as these systems are the relatively most 
efficient ones. This provides the opportunity to pinpoint the crucial elements 
of efficient primary markets in a decontrolled marketing system. 
9. The marketing pattern in fact is more complex and shows a great deal 
of regional variation. A detailed description is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but can be found, for example, in 15 and 24. 
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farmers,, From the market the produce is transferred to the next stages of 
the marketing channel system. This may be a Government Procurement Centre, 
under a government monopoly scheme or under a voluntary scheme if the government 
fixed support price is above the market level,^ In all other cases the produce 
11 is normally shipped to secondary or terminal markets or directly to the mills. 
Compared to the maize marketing system in Kenya, primary wholesale 
markets in India and Pakistan are essential elements of the grain marketing 
system. In the Punjab (Pakistan and India) each market serves an area of about 
2 600 to 1,300 km with approximately 150 to 250 villages within a radius of 15 to 
30 km. (14. p. 31; 24, p. 240) The average daily wheat transactions range 
12 
during the peak season from about 70 to 300 metric tons depending on the region, 
size of markets, catchment area, etc. (15, p. 132; 24, p. 236) For comparison, 
one of the biggest markets in the Western Province of Kenya, Luanda market, 
handled not more than 17 metric tons per day in 1973/74, (l, p. 4) 
For transactions on the scale of those taking place in the Indian 
and Pakistani market centres, the market infrastructure and the organisation 
of the transactions are of great importance. A well organised Indian and 
Pakistani market provides a sufficiently large market yard bordered by market 
stalls for the commission agents and traders, with platforms in front where 
the inflowing produce is piled up until it is sold by auction, weighed, re-
filled into bags, loaded and finally shipped. In the middle of the market 
there are central amenities (library, market information facilities, cafeteria, 
water, etc,) and space for parking animals, carts or lorries. Entrances and 
exits, sufficient in number and size, link the market with the road network 
of the country. All these markets are generally well connected with each other 
by roads and often in addition by railway lines and by communication facilities 
such as telephones. 
Usually, if these markets are well organised as described, they are 
"regulated markets", controlled by a market committee consisting of representa-
tives of farmers, traders and government officials.^ The functions of these 
10. Generally only very big farmers bypass the wholesale market and sell 
directly to the Government Procurement Centre if the procurement price is higher 
than the market price, 
11. In the case of rice, the paddy is usually milled in the primary market 
centres before being shipped to the procurement centres or to other markets. 
12. Estimates on the basis of yearly volume of transactions, assuming that 
70 per cent (15, pp„ 121-123) is handled during the four busiest months, 
13. Retail transactions are included in this figure. 
14. The regulations for these markets are laid down in the "Agricultural 
Produce Markets Act" which was first decreed for the former Punjab Province by 
the colonial powers in 1939. After independence the Act was amended' by the 
Pakistani and Indian Governments. 
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committees are, among others, to provide and improve the market infrastructure, 
to license market functionaries, to control and monitor weights, measures and 
market practices, to settle disputes and to collect market fees which are used 
for running the market. 
Altogether, these types of markets provide the necessary infrastructural 
conditions for an effective and competitive marketing system. As pointed out, 
research on the Indian and Pakistani grain marketing systems has shown that 
they are relatively efficient. This can be attributed in part to the existence 
and functioning of an established network of central wholesale assembly and 
terminal markets. 
Moreover, these markets play a decisive role in government efforts to 
stabilise prices. Since almost the whole flow of produce goes through these 
markets they provide a good opportunity for intervention. During times when 
voluntary supply schemes have been in effect, traders have been ready to 
sell to the nearby Procurement Centres, often within the same urban centre 
near the railway station, as soon as market prices drop below the government 
15 
minimum or support price: in this way a further decline of prices is prevented. 
Hence, because these prices are effective for farmers even if they sell in 
the villages, the intervention on the wholesale market level enables the 
government to guarantee a minimum return to the producers. The links between 
the markets and the Procurement Centres are quite strong since the government 
or the statutory marketing body involves all licensed market traders in the 
procurement operations. Given a voluntary procurement scheme, the traders, 
however, are free to sell to the private sector. 
Comparing the institutional and infrastructural conditions of the 
Indian and Pakistani with the Kenyan food grain marketing systems, the poorly 
developed rural wholesale market infrastructure and the weak links between 
the private informal and the government controlled formal sector of the 
Kenyan maize marketing system become evident. In consequence, if the controls 
of maize marketing in Kenya are to be diminished, all efforts must be made 
to improve the institutional and infrastructual conditions of the rural 
markets and to intensify relations between the private and government marketing 
institutions. If this important area is neglected, government interventions in 
the marketing of maize cannot be effective and are likely to fail. The 
situation would not be much better than it has been in the past. 
15. One of the preconditions is that the Procurement Centres are prepared 
to take all produce supplied. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The discussion so far has shown that some control of maize marketing 
in Kenya is desirable in order to avoid welfare losses for the producers and 
consumers. But it also has revealed, taking the Indian and Pakistani experience 
into consideration, that a less rigid control system than presently exercised 
in Kenya can only prove successful if the physical and institutional infrastucture 
creates a marketing environment which allows a competitive system to emerge, 
linking up the local, district and interregional trading system. 
The system envisaged can best be characterised as a price stabilisation 
scheme with bufferstock operations run by the Maize and Produce Board, whose 
role has to be redefined. At present, the MFB is exerting virtually a domestic 
monopoly which has apparently become obsolete, given present and expected 
developments in the maize production-distribution system. The basic objectives 
of the revised control system would be, as in the past, to protect both 
producers and consumers and to maintain a strategic reserve in case of 
droughts. The role of the MFB under the new scheme would be to act as a buyer 
and seller of maize to keep price fluctuations within given limits. 
Various steps have to be taken in order to implement such a scheme:-
1. Establishing a market information system which serves producers, traders, 
consumers and the MFB. Such a market information system should collect 
and disseminate price information, forecast regional supply and demand 
for estimating regional equilibrium prices, and provide information on 
grades and standards. 
2. Lifting movement restrictions, thus allowing traders and producers to 
move maize freely over district and regional borders. But lifting 
movement restrictions without abolishing the rather restrictive way 
in which transport licenses are issued might lead to new frictions in the 
marketing system in terms of high transport costs charged by truckers 
who run local monopolies. 
3. Establishing rural collection centres on the Indian and Pakistani model. 
These rural collection centres should be established in the producing 
areas, providing basic services for a smoother flow of goods. At the same 
time the centres should be linked up with the interregional transport 
network. Preferably such centres should be sited in places which rank 
third or fourth in the hierarchy of central places in the region, 
assuring that producers on the average will not have to move their 
produce more than 20 miles. In order to assure the functioning of these 
rural collection and trading centres, Market Committees should be 
organised with representatives of all interested parties to provide 
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information, to prevent malpractices, and to act as referees in cases 
of arguments about grades and measures. 
4. Establishing MFB stores in areas without MFB depots. The regional dis-
tribution of MFB depots is not equitable for all areas. Therefore, in 
addition to the existing depots, the M'PB should build up a network of 
stores in rural collection centres and at strategic markets in deficit 
areas to cater for easily accessible MFB outlets. 
5. Defining the price structure and the decision rules for MFB operations. 
In order to achieve price stabilisation and increased allocative 
efficiency, the MFB depots and stores should operate as buying and 
selling centres for producers and traders, operating at prices appropriate 
for the various outlets. 
As mentioned, the floor price should not exceed the export parity 
price. The local buying prices will be derived from it by adding the 
average local transport and handling costs. The local selling price 
would be the local buying price plus handling and storing charges, and 
in the case of deficit regions, also the transfer costs of maize from 
other regions. The ceiling price should not exceed the urban consumer 
price which has to be calculated by taking into consideration the weight 
of purchased maize in the cost of living index for low- and middle-income 
consumers, avoiding welfare losses for the urban consumers. 
Given a well functioning market information system, such pricing 
formulas should not be too difficult to implement if the local depot or 
MFB store can operate freely and has the financial means to buy the 
quantities offered at the prices fixed by MFB fteadiquiarttrers for the specific 
outlet. 
6. Finally the storage capacity of all MFB depots, at five million bags, 
can be used partly for accommodating the strategic minimum reserve of 
two million bags, while the remaining capacity can be used for storing 
other commodities handled by the MFB. 
Although it seems economically feasible and advantageous to decontrol 
the maize marketing system in Kenya in the described way, one has to keep in 
mind that Kenya has not experienced any other maize marketing system yet and 
thus political pressure might come to bear against any major revision. In 
order to show the viability of the proposed scheme, one should test it in one 
region before implementing it on a national scale. 
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SUMMARY 
In this paper the authors attempt to assess the major deficiencies 
of the present maize marketing system, discuss the implications of a completely 
decontrolled maize market, analyse the effects of different types of stabilisa-
tion schemes and review the Indian and Pakistani experience with private per-
formance and various types of government intervention in food grain marketing 
systems, taking their institutional and infrastructural conditions into con-
sideration. As a result, an alternative scheme for regulating the Kenya 
maize market is suggested and proposals are made for the implementation of 
such a scheme. 
In Kenya, rigid controls (price fixing, movement restrictions) are 
imposed on the maize marketing system which have led to various inefficiencies. 
Prices are fixed on inappropriate levels and the parastatal Maize and Produce 
Board (MFB) apparently seems to be unable to stabilise producer and consumer 
prices. By the establishment of movement restrictions, interregional imbalances 
and price differences are aggravated, leading to an extensive illegal trade 
which enables intermediaries to earn considerable excess profits. 
A free market system for maize in Kenya is likely to contribute to 
drastic supply and consumer price fluctuations because of the highly responsive 
commercial farming sector and the inelastic nature of demand, and might 
endanger national food security. Thus, in order to avoid welfare losses for 
producers and consumers, some control has to be imposed. Taking several factors 
into account, a price stabilisation scheme with bufferstock operations 
carried out by the MFB seems to be the most appropriate form of control. The 
role of the MFB would be to act as a buyer and seller of maize to keep price 
fluctuations within certain limits, and in addition to keep a strategic reserve 
in case of droughts 
From experience in India and Pakistan it can be learned that such a 
scheme, relying more on the private sector of the marketing system, may be 
able to protect producers and consumers, but is likely to succeed only if 
the physical and institutional market infrastructure is improved. The 
implementation of the proposed control system requires a network of rural 
collection centres (similar to those in India and Pakistan) and MPB stores, 
located in these centres as well as in strategic markets in deficit areas. 
Furthermore, a market information system has to be established and movement 
restrictions lifted. Finally, the price structure and rules for MFB operations 
have to be clearly defined. The floor price should not exceed the export 
parity price and the ceiling price should be set by taking the weight of 
purchased maize in the cost of living index for low- and middle-income consumers 
into consideration. 
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